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Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, 
and not of living together. 
Aristotle, the Politics (III) 
 
…even if the typical character types of liberal democracies are bland, calculating, 
petty, and unheroic, the prevalence of such people may be a reasonable price to pay 
for political freedom.  
Richard Rorty 1991a: 190 
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Abstract  
This paper looks at Nietzsche’s critique of consensualism, a contractarian 
political project based on the notion that the intersubjectively-rational “will” of the 
subject is the source of legitimate authority of the state and social justice, with 
specific reference to two prominent philosophers, John Rawls and Jürgen 
Habermas. According to consensualists, coexistence is inevitable and a peaceful 
coexistence is desirable since it is the only way to guarantee an equal liberty for all. 
Peaceful coexistence is only possible through rational consensus, and rational 
consensus is possible because human agents have the capacity for reasoning, 
which yields a legitimate authority and justice. Nietzsche would question the 
“triadic formulation” of political consensualism that “rationality” leads to 
“consensus” and “consensus” leads to “legitimacy” and “justice”.  First, 
Nietzsche’s concept of “will to power” (a will to domination and expansion) 
questions the premise that rational capacity makes consensus not only possible 
but also inevitable. Second, it disputes that free-rational will automatically yields 
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legitimacy and justice. According to Nietzsche, a free-rational consensus in a 
plurality of wills to power is not only unfeasible but dangerous too, because 
seeking political consensus among the mass leads to cultural degeneration and 
human decline. This paper concludes that Nietzsche’s socio-political theory can be 
best characterised as a critique of modernity, not a viable alternative to the 
current political consensualism. Nietzsche’s philosophy merely exposes the tacitly 
coercive nature of “rationalised consensus”, which is the basis of legitimacy in 
modern politics.  
 
Key Words: Nietzsche, Rawls, Habermas, Consensualism, will to power, 
rationality 
 
Abbreviations:  
The following published and translated texts of Nietzsche’s works are cited 
throughout the paper by short abbreviations.  Also, instead of page number, the 
sections are cited with the symbol (§) and followed by each section number. 
AC The Anti-Christ, Translated by R.J. Hollingdale 
BGE Beyond Good and Evil, Edited by R.Horstmann & J. Norman (tr. Judith 
Norman) 
EGP Early Greek Philosophy and Other Essays, Translated by M. Mugge 
GM On the Genealogy of Morality, Edited by K.Ansell-Pearson & C. Diethe 
GS The Gay Science, Edited by B. Williams (Translated by J. Nauckhoff) 
HAH Human, All Too Human, Translated by R.J. Hollingdale 
TI Twilight of The Idols, Translated by R.J. Hollingdale 
WP The Will To Power, Edited by O. Levy (Translated by Anthony M. 
Ludovici) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Madness of reason, a contradiction in terms, does not sound as absurd today 
as one might have thought back in the 17th century, particularly among the 
Enlightenment philosophers. Certainly, when one looks at the amount of suffering 
caused by Reason, from the industrial scale massacres of people in the 20th century 
(that goes on to this day) to the systematic destruction of nature in the hands of 
the privileged, one can only point a finger at the technological weapons and 
instruments as well as institutional apparatuses and values Reason has provided 
the powerful to inflict such misery on the powerless and devastation on nature. 
Today, in the hands of liberal consensualists, Reason is being used as a levelling 
tool, eroding individual differences and cultural diversity, all in the name of 
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equality. We are not the first to realise the destructive power of Reason in the 
hands of the powerful. In fact, it was a 19th century German philosopher, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, who effectively exposed the dangers of modern obsession with 
championing Reason above everything else.  
Due to his posthumous association with the Nazism and his rejection of 
Plato-Christian tradition of “truth-seeking philosophy”, Nietzsche remains a 
controversial and ambiguous figure within the Western political philosophy.  
Nietzsche argued that the Enlightenment’s Reason had become an instrument of 
power. With Reason at its disposal, power could tame humans as well as create its 
own truths. Nietzsche belonged to the counter-Enlightenment tradition of 
aestheticism (and loosely romanticism), where instincts, feelings and imaginations 
were given primacy over the rationality of the Enlightenment tradition of Kant 
and Fichte. However, unlike other romanticists, Nietzsche’s philosophy is not a 
total rejection of a rational and instrumental world. Instead, he wanted to utilise 
Reason to build an aesthetic life around genius and high culture through 
“aristocratic radicalism” as a political system that would replace the egalitarian 
politics of emancipation, freedom, rights and justice. He wanted artists and 
cultural geniuses at the helm of political and social institutions, not politicians, 
bureaucrats or technocrats.  
Nietzsche’s philosophy tried to answer the question: ‘what we have come to be 
and what we have it in us to become?’ (HAH, Richard Schach’s Introduction: xvi) or 
‘what humankind ought to become’ (Conway, 1997, p. 3). He concluded that human 
genius and high culture could not flourish within modernity, because its 
institutions emphasised too heavily on shaky moralised notions such as good, right 
and obligation (Gray, 1995, p. 148). This impotence of reason-obsessed modernity 
to adequately fill the moral vacuum left by “god’s death” (GS §343) would 
inevitably lead to nihilism, a conviction that life is absurd (WP §1-3). Now the rise 
in religious and market fundamentalism, political apathy and scepticism towards 
democracy and non-realisation of justice and legitimacy as optimistically hoped by 
contractarians seem to resonate with Nietzsche’s prediction. And most importantly, 
Nietzsche philosophy explicates the charge of cultural imperialism levelled at 
Reason-driven modern liberal socio-economic system that is actively engaged in 
eroding nature and cultures of their diversity and differences.  
In contrast to Nietzsche’s hierarchical politics, consensualism represents a 
politics based on unforced and non-coercive rational agreement. This tradition 
goes back to the contractarian tradition of Hobbes and Rousseau, where “will” of 
the subject is the source of political legitimacy. What distinguishes consensualism 
from traditional contractarianism is its notion of two distinctive types of 
rationality: instrumental (selfish) and inter-subjective (altruistic and reciprocal). 
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Rawls and Habermas, the focus of this critique, root their consensualism in 
inter-subjective rationality, claiming that they have solved the problems of 
justice-based political coexistence within a plurality of conceptions of the good, 
without surrendering the equality in the rights and liberty of each individual. 
Although Rawls and Habermas have different ways of coming to such a conclusion, 
their premises and conclusions are the same: “rational agreement” solves the 
problem of “justice”. On the one hand both have rejected the metaphysical 
foundation of Reason, as a priori, independent of experience, arguing that 
inter-subjective reason is rooted in individual agency. On the other hand, both 
argue that the rational capacity of the subject remains a priori.  
Nietzsche’s critique of the Enlightenment rests on his critique of Reason, 
which can be reconstructed to apply to political consensualism since both (the 
Enlightenment and consensualism) are conterminous, as they both give primacy 
to Reason and the “will” of the people. First, this paper will examine Nietzsche’s 
philosophical critique of modern reason through his concept of will to power, as it 
questions the consistency of the reason-consensus analogy. Second, it will look into 
Nietzsche’s politico-normative critique of legitimacy and justice as implausible and 
unfeasible objectives of politics. Finally, it will reflect on Nietzsche’s own political 
paradox of will to power and its application and implications. This paper will 
conclude that Nietzsche’s theory of will to power provides a robust critique of 
consensualism, without providing a viable alternative.  
 
II. Critique of Subject-Centred Reason 
 
The European Enlightenment thinkers of 17th and 18th centuries hailed 
modernity as a dawn of human civilisation, where Reason was to emancipate 
mankind from religious dogmas and the individual from the injustices of 
traditions. Nietzsche was the first philosopher to effectively question this 
optimism about reason-based modernity (Gray, 1995, p. 164 & Hill, 2005, p. 1). 
Nietzsche argued that life is a chaotic dynamic process without any stability or 
direction; therefore, there was no reason to believing in “sense” or “value” of life, 
since accepting them implies that there is an “objective” and “natural” purpose for 
life, which there is not (BGE: xvii). The Enlightenment replaces religion and the 
truth of god with the truth of Reason. For Nietzsche the death of god was not the 
end of a quest to seek truth; instead of religion, philosophers turned to 
rationality-based science to establish truth (GS §108). The modernity project is 
based on values inherited from the Christian tradition and unified “under the 
aegis of a rational reconstruction of morality” (Gray, 1995, p. 163). For Nietzsche, 
modernity’s search to discover an objective and universal truth resonates similarly 
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to that of a religious search for God (TI “Reason in Philosophy” §6).  
 
[Insofar as the word] “knowledge” has any sense, the world is knowable; 
but it maybe interpreted differently, it has not one sense behind it, but 
hundreds of senses… It is our needs that interpret the world; our instincts 
and their impulses for and against. Every instinct is a sort of thirst for 
power [will to power]; each has its point of view, which it would … impose 
upon all the other instincts as their norm. (WP §481] 
 
Nietzsche counters the issue of truth with interpretation. By arguing that one 
interpretation is stronger, it counts as ‘power’ and it is not separate from power 
(GS, ix). To see truth, as “the ultimate authority”, is to see it as a “divine power”, 
therefore confirming its religious origin (GS §344). Countering this, Habermas 
argues that if every truth is an interpretation and its validity claim cannot be 
objective, therefore, Nietzsche cannot admit his own theory of power to be true 
(2002, p. 125). Nietzsche, however, suggests that his theory of power is one of 
many interpretations and context-dependent, and subject to contestation. In the 
introduction to BGE, Rolf-Peter Hortsmann argues that Nietzsche’s theory of the 
truth claims that truth is defined by an incomplete context, thus every truth is 
partially true (or true depending on your perspective)(xxii-iii), so one cannot claim 
an objective true to be true for every one and context-independent. Modernity’s 
rationality-based search for a single, universally-applicable truth is flawed, and a 
disguise for creating and preserving a hegemonic politics. 
Nietzsche’s notion of will to power is Darwinian in essence, a chaotic and 
uncertain world where the sole motivation of an individual is to grow and expand 
its power and domination, through coercive means or through Reason. In WP §636 
he explains:   
 
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master of all space, 
and to extend its power (its will to power) and to thrust back everything 
that resists it. But insomuch as it is continually meeting the same 
endeavours on the part of other bodies, it concludes by coming to terms 
with those (by "combining" with those), which are sufficiently related to it 
– and thus they then conspire together for power. And the process 
continues [italic in original].  
 
Nietzsche argues that this process of circular power struggle and consensus 
building is eternally recurring, or never-ending, only agents changing. The 
agreements reached through such process ought not to be rational, but rather 
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organic, a temporary conclusion of the power struggle itself. Thus, there is nothing 
noble in the consensus reached, it is merely a process that is shaped by power and 
that it repeats itself eternally. This means that rationalised consensus does not 
entail political legitimacy and justice, because a universal system that guarantees 
such status for all is impossible. It is rather a group of individuals who are either 
bound by some commonalities or forced into a unity by external forces who come 
together to create a system of justice. It is by no means free from internal or 
external power struggles. It is temporal and culturally exclusive, not universal 
and inclusive beyond a given society.  
For Nietzsche epistemology of truth is a political battleground between the 
strong and the weak (Glenn, 2004, p. 582). It is not simply that one is true and the 
other is false, but it is power-relation that makes one true and another false, e.g. 
by wielding one’s power of argumentation or through physical coercion. According 
to Nietzsche, with the aid of rational science and technology, modernity strives for 
predictability and certainty in human life, almost to a ‘faith’ level (GS §347). This 
shows that modernity is afraid of uncertainty in human life; therefore, one can 
conclude that reason-based modernity does not believe in the emancipation of 
humanity but rather tries to devise effective ways to predictably control human 
life. Logic and certainty calm and give confidence (GS §370). He exposes the 
‘physiological self-contradiction’ of modernity. On the one hand it promotes 
individual freedom, (TI “Expedition” §41), while on the other hand uses the same 
rational methods to control individuals within groups. He saw modernity as a 
project of mastery over nature through science and over humanity through truth 
(both derived from the same rationality). Devigne believes ‘Nietzsche feels trapped 
by the modern quest to use political and technological power to overcome natural 
differences and hierarchy' (1999, p. 694). 
For Nietzsche, subject-centred rationality cannot be the basis of morality, 
because “rational” subjects are “self-referential”. In other words, rationality was 
developed as a tool for understanding in order to dominate either the natural 
world or other humans for one’s own benefits. He explains: 
 
The object is not “to know” but to schematise, - to impose as much 
regularity and form upon chaos, as our practical needs require. In the 
formation of reason, logic, and the categories, it was a need in us that was 
the determining power: not the need “to know” but to classify, to 
schematise, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation. The 
adjustment and interpretation of all similar and equal things, - the same 
process, which every sensual impression undergoes, is the development of 
reason! [Italic added](WP §515)  
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Here Nietzsche’s analysis of human knowledge and objectivity is similar to 
Kant’s Copernican Turn, where he argued that the objects should conform to our 
knowledge of them. Kant’s epistemic quest was to make objects fit our knowledge 
of them but Nietzsche’s ontology argues that our selfish needs force such 
regularities and schematic understanding of them. Nietzsche’s notion of Reason is 
developing and becoming while Kant’s metaphysics ‘condemns us to freedom’1 via 
Reason, with being as a priori, which means we cannot choose to be unfree, if we 
desire to be so. Nietzsche argues that this process of regularisation and 
schematisation of objects also changes man himself. But for Nietzsche, Reason 
itself is developed through this process of schematisation and adjustments of 
objects based on selfish needs rather than being altruistic and reciprocal. In 
consensualism, Reason is part of man, a priori not developed through experience. 
For Nietzsche regularities in human life emerge, out of chaos, as a result of the 
experience of becoming. Will to power is the motivation that creates reason (s) and 
values. Here, Nietzsche elaborates:  
 
The utility of self-preservation … stands as the motive force behind the 
development of the organs of knowledge. …the measure of desire for 
knowledge depends upon the extent to which will to power grows in a 
certain species: a species gets a grasp of a given amount of reality, in order 
to master it, in order to enlist that amount in its service. [Italic in 
original](WP§480) 
 
Contrary to consensualists’ beliefs, Nietzsche argues that ‘there are no such 
things as mind, reason, thought, consciousness, soul, will, or truth’ beyond 
human’s need and experience (WP §480). Metaphysical foundation of Reason and 
truth do not exist prior to experience. But humans need exactness and regularities 
in life, which are the cause of development of those apparently “solid” phenomena. 
For Nietzsche the truth of rationality remains entirely subjective; the source of 
rationality is individual subject with will to power, which questions the claim of 
epistemic certainty that political theorists seek. The knowledge of rational subject 
is problematic for Nietzsche. Connolly (1988) argues that for Nietzsche humans 
are neither born to be subject of a political system, where they decide the 
legitimacy of such system, nor they contain an inner quality that draws them 
towards ‘stasis and subjectivity’ (p. 157). 
It implies that agents become subjects or they can be turned into one’s 
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stated that we could not escape responsibility because we are condemned to be free.  
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subjects through coercive power. Connolly (1988) further states: ‘To be a subject is 
to be made into a calculable, uniform, promising being, capable of being held 
responsible for deviant conduct and deserving of punishment for irregular acts’ (p. 
157). Under this observation, there is a dichotomy of right and duty, as duty comes 
prior to rights. That is the duty to be rational on the part of the subjects, before 
they are able to transfer their wills to the justice system, which in turn provides 
them with rights. 
Nietzsche’s rejection of Reason as a priori, however, does not entail 
irrationalism; instead according to Owen, a Nietzschean scholar, by idealising an 
ascetic life as a good life, Nietzsche tries to provide a telos for human existence 
(solving the problem of nihilism), which requires realisation of one’s rational self 
by overcoming one’s irrational physical and cultural desires (1995, p. 52). This is 
unfeasible in a compossible way consensualists offer, since rights and freedom to 
become genius is only possible in a hierarchical society. This also refutes 
Habermas’s claim that for Nietzsche Reason and unreason are indistinguishable 
(2002, p. 125). Nietzsche believed that evaluation of tastes and good are subjective, 
thus no inter-subjective validity claims are justifiable, because Reason is not a 
priori and solidly available or given. In fact it evolves through experience and 
cultural contexts. Therefore, subject-centred reason always strive to be 
instrumental and strategic and selfish, not a force to emancipate mankind or 
create equality among them. It rather chains some by others; it either coerces 
them by force or through rationalised truth claims.  
 
III. Critique of Inter-subjective Reason 
 
In response to Nietzsche’s critique of Reason, both Habermas and Rawls 
argued that there are two distinctive types of Reason. Habermas acknowledges 
Nietzsche’s contribution in the understanding of rationality used instrumentally 
by some (state, private firms and interest groups) to dominate others, but 
disagrees with the claim that rationality is only instrumental. He argues that 
there are two distinctive types of rationality, which he calls: instrumental 
rationality and communicative rationality. Habermas states: “The nihilistic 
domination of subject-centred reason is conceived as the result and expression of a 
perversion of will to power” (Habermas, 2002, p. 95). Habermas disagrees with 
Nietzsche’s conclusion that the Enlightenment project is doomed to failure, 
because instrumentality of its reason makes it corrupt. Instead, he envisages a 
state of ideal speech situation, where rational individuals communicate to solve 
their differences through rational deliberation, not through the unchallenged 
influence of power, discursive or physical (1984a, p. 16). Rawls, too, argues for an 
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agreed justice system, where reasonableness plays a major role in establishing an 
overlapping consensus (1993). Both Habermas and Rawls make distinction 
between two types of rationality: subject-centred & inter-subjective. Both argue 
that it is the second type of reason, inter-subjective, that brings about consensus, 
legitimacy and justice within a polity.  
Habermas elaborates himself on the link between communicative rationality 
and consensualism:  
 
The communicative rationality recalls older ideas of logos, inasmuch as it 
brings along with it the connotations of a non-coercively unifying, 
consensus-building force of a discourse in which the participants overcome 
their at first subjectively based views in favour of a rationally motivated 
agreement (2002p. 315).  
 
Unlike Habermas’s Marxian origin, Rawls’s notion of overlapping consensus 
is based on the old notion of non-coercive agreement within the liberal 
contractarian tradition but modified in response to the modern pluralistic setting 
with diverse conceptions of the good. For Rawls the purpose of political liberalism 
is to create, as he called a well-ordered society by means of Reason and reasonable 
notions of the good life. Rawls’s argument is similar about the inter-subjective 
rationality:  
 
Reasonable persons, we say, are not moved by the general good as such but 
desire for its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can 
cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that reciprocity 
should hold within that world so that each benefits along with others 
(1993 pp. 48-50).  
 
There are differences between the two thinkers. Habermas argues for an 
inter-subjective rationality, which can determine what justice ought to be. In other 
words, Habermas (1996c) does not presuppose that humans have the capacity to 
justice as such, but through rational argumentation and deliberation a consensus 
on what justice ought to be can be achieved. Rawls (1971), on the other hand, 
argues that humans posses the sense of justice prior to consensus and this is seen 
through everyday intuition.  He terms this intuitive practice as reflective 
equilibrium, a state of balance reached as a result of a deliberative process among 
differing set of beliefs through mutual self-adjustments, on moral or non-moral 
issues. Furthermore, Rawls, adapting Aristotle’s view, argued that consensus 
through reasonableness can be constructed (and nurtured) within a political 
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culture as a virtue. By this he meant that the current context of modern liberal 
democracy was the very setting that could develop and harness reasonableness 
and consensualism. Habermas’s theory of communicative action leaves an open 
end to the terms of agreement, but only argues that given the ideal speech 
situation, individuals, with however diverse conceptions of the good, can reach a 
rational agreement. Habermas’s theory is proceduralist, based on presuppositions 
and designed to guarantee the impartiality of the process of judging’ (Habermas, 
1990, p. 122). It leaves the substantive agreement on principles of justice open to 
the procedure of public deliberation. He believes that his theory holds truth in 
every human society; therefore, it is context-independent and universally binding 
(Habermas, 1984, p. 287).  
However, despite their difference, their premise and conclusion are the same. 
The objective of a consensual politics is to achieve equal rights and liberty for 
individual subjects. Thus the pursuit of equal liberty or justice presupposes the 
foundation that humans are equal as a priori and inequality should be overcome. 
De Olivera argues that ‘Both Rawls and Habermas have adapted Kant’s 
cognitivist, universalist and emancipatory conception of moral autonomy so as to 
attempt at an original understanding of publicity and political culture’ (2000p. 
583).  Both agree on the triadic formula of consensualism: Reason → consensus → 
justice. 
Nietzsche disagrees with the distinction between different types of reason 
and also rejects a foundational equality-claim in reasoning capacity of all subjects 
as a priori. Nietzsche questions the solidity of the consenting agency by arguing 
that the nature of the world is becoming not being. Thus, ontologically, will to 
power of each individual as a unit does not allow inter-subjective rationality to 
develop, simply because the driving force for each subject is to grow. Therefore the 
equal participation in the consensus process is not to create equality and justice 
but sway others for one’s own benefits. Epistemologically, the knowledge of the 
subject as solidly rational, a never-changing entity, is also flawed. 
According to Habermas, the notion of inter-subjective rationality comes from 
the necessity of coexistence, and it is universal because it is unavoidable (1985p. 
196). Rawls and Habermas rely on the same notion of the subject’s rational 
capacity, similar to subject-centred rationality, which both reject as strategic and 
instrumental. So how is a self-interested and instrumentally-rational subject 
turned into a cooperative and communicatively rational agent? For Rawls, it can 
be constructed given the kind of society and political culture we live in and also in 
his presumption that the sense of justice is part of human beings. Habermas’s 
dialectics sees agreement inherent in rational argumentation and everyday action, 
if certain rules are followed, mainly non-involvement of coercive power during the 
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deliberation process. So both argue that inter-subjective reason has a different 
quality from that of instrumental rationality. And it affects all and is unavoidable 
given the pluralistic and diverse society we live in. However, according to 
Nietzsche, will to power is the architectural base of rationality and pure 
inter-subjectivity or reasonableness cannot be detached from power. In other 
words, power-neutral discourse is impossible and the claim of its existence hides a 
deceit.  
The critique of the Enlightenment’s subject-centred reason can also apply 
here, since the subject of both subject-centred contractarianism and 
inter-subjective rationality of consensualism is the same. There has not been 
fundamental change in the characteristics of the subject as far as Reason and 
self-interest are concerned. Nietzsche argues that the essence of Reason is power 
and will to power. To claim that in a given time every individual has the same 
amount of rationality (therefore power) within a social context to come up with a 
fair consensus that could become the basis of justice is to presuppose that society 
would never change. And all individuals are identical. In Nietzsche’s philosophy 
power is a relational concept, often a zero-sum game. To separate Reason from the 
circle of power is a futile enterprise and the world is an irreconcilable and 
“recurring” struggle of powers for freedom: 
 
In the first stage, one demands justice at the hands of those who have 
power. In the second, one speaks of “freedom,” that is to say, one wishes to 
“shake oneself free” from those who have power. In the third stage, one 
speaks of “equal rights” – that is to say, so long as one is not a predominant 
personality one wishes to prevent one’s competitors from growing in power. 
(WP §86)  
 
Nietzsche, also, rejects the epistemological notion of a rational agent as a 
solid entity. Power shapes the rational being and its capacity for reasoning. 
Relying on a notion of rationally capable agents of consensus presupposes the 
individual as solid, with certain capabilities and definitions. This not only 
contradicts the notion of the autonomous individuals who are different from one 
another and subject to change and growth, but also assumes that subjects have 
equal capacity to develop the right kind of rationality and fairness, given the right 
environment. Nietzsche disagrees with this robotic notion of the individual and 
argues that truth (of the subject) is created through the criterion of power (TI “The 
Four Great Errors” §5). In fact this notion of a one-dimensional rational being is 
seen as agent of consent, as if only capable of such a thing and nothing else.  
Will to power as a force of self-growth and self-expansion does not necessarily 
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converge non-coercively. This makes free consensus problematic if it is only 
possible on the basis of rationality. For Nietzsche the divergence of wills to power 
can only be solved through coercion and domination, or deceptive apparatuses. 
Since,  for Nietzsche, the aim of a political coexistence is cultural greatness and 
nurturing of artistic genius, coercion comes as a natural method of control :  
 
… if [a body] is a living and not a dying ... will have to be the embodiment 
of will to power, it will want to grow, spread, grab, win dominance, — not 
out of any morality or immorality but because it is alive and because life is 
precisely will to power... 'Exploitation'... belongs to the essence of being 
alive, as a fundamental organic function; it is a result of genuine will to 
power, which is just the will of life.(BGE §259)  
 
Will to power is not simply an instinct of self-preservation, but mainly it seeks 
to free its power from any constraints. Owen sums up Nietzsche’s notion of truth 
that it “… is not independent of our cognitive/affective interests. On this account, 
our best standards of rationality are a complex of effectually ranked cognitive 
interests’ (1995, p. 44). This entails that our knowledge of the subject with rational 
capacity is not separable from our will to power and interest. Thus it is 
implausible to claim that the sense of justice is present in individual agents (as a 
metaphysical fact). Also, the argument that rational capacity can be cultivated 
given a liberal democratic culture is a value, not truth as claimed by 
consensualists.  
 
IV. Critique of consensualism 
 
Nietzsche believes that establishing a legitimate authority that protects 
autonomy is not only an unfeasible project but a dangerous enterprise too. His 
critique of political consensualism centres around two important issues: (1) not 
everyone is equally rational (i.e. powerful) and (2) democratic consensualism as a 
levelling system entails mediocrity. Also, by promoting universal equality, it 
rejects otherness (including cultural differences) and degenerates individual 
creativity and genius.  
Rational and free consensus is an idealised concept and the pretence to 
achieving it in the presence of will to power, leads to the use of coercive methods i.e. 
physical violence or through rationalised universal truths within the institutional 
regimes. The latter differs from a blunt coercion as it is achieved by deploying 
rational discourse through institutionalised rules. Individuals and groups are 
inherently unequal in power, money, political voice, and reasoning capacity; 
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therefore, this so-called free and fair consensus is neither free nor fair. Nietzsche 
argues that relying on the politics of legitimacy and social contract leads us to 
normalisation because an inter-subjective consensus is not power-neutral; instead 
it becomes part of the apparatus of discipline by restricting individual freedom 
within this inter-subjective rationality. Discourse on moral righteousness and 
legitimacy is not a way of protecting individuals from the existence of power, 
argues Ansell-Pearson (1999), author of many books on Nietzsche, but also used as 
disciplining tools (p. 174).  
According to consensualists, the notion of legitimacy is an integral part of 
justice, without which an authority cannot function fairly because its moral 
authority would be weakened. The assumption of an equally free individual falls 
apart once he enters into this process of inter-subjective rationality and the 
individual is demanded (rationally coerced) to be reasonable and to have a 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine of the good, otherwise consensus is not 
possible. In other words it is institutionalised subjects who are ‘educated’ to 
believe in the fairness of the process. Both Habermas and Rawls assume 
consensus inevitable among the rational subjects, thus liberty of the consenting 
subject is unconditionally available, meaning that the subject must be free and 
remain rational. On the other hand, consensualism takes a Kantian 
self-affirmative and self-dependent freedom, as if man is rationally free prior to 
authority and justice, as a pre-requisite for their notion of free will to consent. 
Nietzsche suggests that since will to good and justice is internal and cannot 
be seen from the outside (as in the Kantian noumenal realm) it is impossible to be 
sure if it vanishes one day (1957). Taylor (1975), a prominent communitarian 
critique of modern liberalism,  echoes Nietzsche’s argument: ‘If the radical 
freedom of self-dependent is ultimately empty [without purpose], then it risks 
ending in nihilism, that is, self-affirmation through the rejection of all values’ (p. 
563). The emptiness of free rational will is evident in the notion of the subject of 
consensus if one argues that the subject is only rational; and Reason has the 
highest authority within an individual, not instinct, emotion or compassion.  
Nietzsche argues that by imposing a free rational will on the individual, 
consensualism places responsibility on him, which is indeed used to punish and 
discipline.  
 
‘It is the most egregious theological trick …to make mankind “responsible”. 
Whenever men try to trace the sense of responsibility home to anyone, it is 
the instinct of punishment and of the desire to judge which is active. The 
doctrine of the will was invented principally for the purpose of punishment, 
- that is to say, with the intention of tracing guilt.’ (TI, “The Four Great 
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Errors” §7) 
 
The legitimacy crisis of political consensualism lies in its wrong presumption 
that the subject is a free rational being. Will to power, according to Coole, a 
Nietzschean scholar, ‘defies the notion of political agency, moral responsibility or 
coherent identity’ (1998, p. 354) and there are different and individualised moral 
and political references.  
The notion of the subject and his characteristics – reasoning capacity; 
fairness and sense of justice (Rawls); the rules of domination-free communication 
(Habermas) – are universal assumptions and excludes those who do not fit that 
definition or are not rationally available for citizenship. These are taken as if they 
are universally true and they can stand in any context. The justification offered is 
that seeking agreement,  is impossible and implausible without certain 
universally accepted criteria. Also both thinkers limit the application of their 
theories within a liberal democratic society, where all those values are the 
embodiment of that society. In principle they both assume that their notion of 
human agency must be universalised, which can be interpreted as an expansionist 
theory of liberal values. In other words it is a cultural will to growth and 
dominance to the detriments of other cultures’ values and norms.  
By constructing a theory of justice only in the political realm Rawls wants to 
show that he accepts pluralism (conflicting conceptions of the good) in the private 
realm but wanted to find a “political consensus” instead. In other words, he wants 
to construct a political theory of justice, which finds overlapping consensus 
amongst citizens of a polity instead of individuals’ personal ethics and their 
conception of the good. But he relies on citizens’ reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines of the good to build consensus. Universal reasonableness is a 
prerequisite for Rawls (and liberal politics) to build consensus. This conceptual 
assumption leads liberals to a universalisibility claim, which according to 
Nietzsche’s philosophy puts Rawls back to where he wanted to depart from,  as 
certain prerequisites should be in place i.e. rational capacity, sense of justice, 
having an agreeable doctrine of the good etc in order to be participants in the 
process of consensus building. In this way political liberalism picks and choose 
among “able” subjects, which leaves some outside the proposed criteria, unable to 
benefit from justice actively, as to make decisions. This universalistic assumption 
means a rejection of the plurality of the good, which Rawls tries to respond to in 
the first place. Reasonable consensus is similar to the process of normalisation of 
differences and creating identical society, which is the opposite of political and 
ethical pluralism. ‘Their usual mistaken premise is that they affirm some 
consensus among peoples, at least among tame peoples, concerning certain moral 
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principles, and then conclude that these principles must be unconditionally 
binding also for you and me’ (GS §345) 
The danger of hegemonic politics was at the centre of liberal critique of former 
communist blocs but now there is a need for self-critique for liberalism. Gray, a 
former liberal who has turned into a critique of liberalism argues: ‘[Despite] all the 
criticisms that it encourages and institutionalises, liberalism enjoys virtual 
hegemony in modern Western intellectual life’ (1995 p. 150). The same can be true 
of consensualism, since it relies on a liberal society. The sole focus of liberalism on 
individual liberty and equality has been criticised by various corners, but what 
makes Nietzsche’s critique more important is his sharp consequentialist cultural 
critique of consensual politics, by arguing that while it is unachievable, democracy 
or egalitarianism's  mere attempt, in its purest form, endangers cultured nobility 
and the creation of genius. ‘If culture really rested upon the will of a people… 
tearing the wall of culture… desire for justice, for the equalisation of suffering, 
would swamp all other ideas’ (EGP, “The Greek state” §7).  
Politics is characterised by value creation (BGE §285) and wars show the 
decisiveness of such struggle (Montari, 2003, p. 69). Nietzsche states that social 
hierarchy is necessary for the cultivation of high humanity and great culture. The 
objection might be that it is not the hierarchical or egalitarian society, but it is 
culture itself that promotes genius rather than the social organisation. We can 
cultivate such virtues in individuals within a democratic setting, as Nietzsche 
himself grew in a society he criticised for promoting decadence (Welshon, 2004, p. 
211). The argument is that social stratification is not necessary for creating genius, 
as Nietzsche suggested that sometimes genius emerges as a sign of resistance to 
the hegemonic social values (TI, “Expeditions” §44). His response is that the root of 
injustice is not in society, but in nature and the attempt to correct such injustice is 
futile (WP “preface” §4); therefore, an excuse in the hands of the powerful to 
control and discipline others and build a conformed society based on their own 
hegemonic notion of the good.  
 
V. Nietzsche’s Alternative 
 
Nietzsche’s critique of consensualism purposefully rests on his own political 
convictions: promoting culture and art. Ansell-Pearon argues that Nietzsche’s 
politics of the overman aims to divide society into dominant and dominated 
through politically-controlled violence (1991p. 148). Nietzsche's justification for 
such a hierarchical society is two folds; first, he thinks that an egalitarian politics 
is dangerous, because the outcome of a rationality-driven system is nihilism. 
Second, an openly hierarchical system facilitates the ascent of a higher form of 
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human being, i.e. the overman (WP §866). In fact, human society does not exist for 
harmony and equality, but to produce greatness in order to avert nihilism in a 
state of purposeless and meaningless human life after the death of God: ‘Art is 
with us in order that we may not perish through truth’ (WP §822) 
Nietzsche wants amoral politics and sees human life as worthless if it has no 
cultural or artistic benefit to offer. It seems a deeply shocking statement, but 
Nietzsche harmonises society through power domination and argues that this 
happens anyway, power-neutral discourse of justice and rights are instruments 
used to tame and control. Modern political and moral values are created through 
relations of power (the powerful excreting those values); therefore, morality 
certainly has weakened man, made him less dangerous through the depressing 
influence of fear, pain, wounds, and hunger, and it is converted into a sick animal 
(TI, “The Improvers of Mankind” §2). Nietzsche’s political man needs to be more 
creative and for him the legacy of humanity lies in its cultural creativity not of 
living together harmoniously and peacefully. The burden of moral politics prevents 
its achievement; it holds individuals from being dangerous and creative (WP 
§404).  
Nietzsche’s high culture and genius-nurturing perfectionism proposes that 
will to power has to be reconciled with the conduit of history, otherwise the pure 
self-defining will to power leads to ‘foolishness and anger’, an impasse (Z, “On 
Redemption” §161). In other words, will to power in its purest forms leads to 
resentment and needs to be contained, thus a hierarchical social organisation 
becomes necessary (ibid §163). Taylor also sees the despair of realising freedom 
and that the self-dependent freedom if not stopped leads to nihilism as Nietzsche 
suggested (1975, p. 563). Ansell-Pearson, however, somewhat naively, sees the lack 
of legitimacy in Nietzsche’s politics as a deficiency, by looking at legitimacy in a 
liberal sense, which is derived from the free rational will of the subject (1999, p. 
51), while Nietzsche’s legitimacy transcends such will and places it in the project 
of creating high humanity not justice.  
Connolly argues that ‘[will to power] exposes self-deceit involved in the 
modern pretence that such project of mastery [over the world] could be 
consummated democratically in accord with liberal standards of rights and dignity’ 
(1998p. 161). However, he, too, rather optimistically argues that Nietzsche’s 
politics enables the difference to exist within a Nietzschean democracy Connolly 
has developed in Identity/difference (1991), where difference is not overcome but 
accepted within the self, so that individuals do not struggle to portray a unity of 
the self. For him consensualism denies difference by overcoming and eliminating it, 
but a politics of difference “inspired” by Nietzsche corrects that deficiency within a 
liberal setting by diversifying individuality rather than uniting them. Connolly 
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bases his argument on the fact that injustice is not only caused by nature as 
Nietzsche suggested but also by capitalism (Connolly, 1988, pp. 171-5). Thus, he 
asks for a radicalised liberalism, which ‘reaches into the subject itself rather than 
taking it as the starting point for reflection’ and also ‘challenges the hegemonic 
economic expansion rather than making a precondition of liberty’. Furthermore it 
‘accepts nature as a source of difference” and relaxes normalisation to allow the 
decedent voice to grow’. This radicalised liberalism would reach toward Nietzsche 
as Marx did to Hegel (Connolly, 1988, p. 174).  
This reconstruction contains its own paradox, like other post-modern and 
liberal interpretations of Nietzsche’s politics. On the one hand, it argues for more 
justice through the politics of consensus, which eliminates otherness and 
difference. On the other hand, he takes Nietzsche’s concept of will to power and 
perspectivism as a starting point that difference not only should be preserved but 
also actively promoted. Will to power and perspectivism stand on the opposite of 
consensual justice and consensual legitimacy claim, thus Nietzsche himself 
rejected justice as a nihilistic value, exposing Connolly’s paradoxical solution. 
Nietzsche does not have a problem with coercing others’ wills to power to achieve 
human greatness.  
Those familiar with Nietzsche’s politics, agree that a healthy debate between 
Nietzsche and liberal consensualism might help us to better understand today’s 
political problems in pluralist and multi-cultural societies. As Abbey & Appell, 
another prominent Nietzschean scholar, declare: ‘So long as political theorists 
dismiss [Nietzsche’s] radical aristocratism as uninteresting and trivial, his serious 
charges against democracy and equality doctrines in general will remain 
unanswered’ (1999 p. 124) Warren, too, suggests that engaging Nietzsche’s politics 
can strengthen democratic politics (1999, p. 126). Nietzsche’s aristocratic 
radicalism has at least a clear vision; creating high humanity and cultural genius, 
which has been lacking within a democratic political theory. The sole purpose of 
consensualism is how to overcome inequality and create a legitimate authority 
that guarantees justice, and this ignores the fact that human society does not only 
need justice and equality, but also human creativity and cultural triumphs.  
Abbey and Appel conclude that Nietzsche challenges us to choose “between 
democratic equality and cultural entropy on the one hand, and inequality and 
heightened levels of human flourishing [perfectionism], on the other hand” (1999 p. 
124). This dichotomy remains at the heart of Nietzsche’s politics, but how to make 
democratic social organisation to produce the heightened level of human flouring, 
while keeping cultural diversity in the presence of equality intact? This is the 
fundamental question to which present-day politics needs an answer. Nietzsche’s 
will to power exposes the problem, but falls short of providing a full-blown 
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solution. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
According to Nietzsche’s concept of will to power, the consensual claims that 
inter-subjective rationality lead to consensus, which in turn could be the basis of a 
justice system is unfounded on both philosophical and political level. 
Philosophically, there is an inconsistency between rationality and consensus in the 
presence of will to power. Politically, rational consensus does not entail justice and 
legitimacy, as rational individuals are neither equal in power-relations nor solid as 
a rational entity. Habermas acknowledges Nietzsche’s critique of instrumental 
rationality within modernity, that instead of emancipating humanity, Reason has 
become an instrument of domination and coercion. Rawls, too, has accepted 
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and theory of the good, and that diversity and pluralism 
makes it hard to agree on the conception of the good life, thus an agreement has to 
be beyond good and bad. However, despite this penetration of Nietzsche’s political 
thoughts into consensual tradition, the quest for equality remains at odds with 
Nietzsche’s political philosophy. Nietzsche’s critique of consensualism offers a good 
explanation for Euro-centricity and liberal-centred approaches by Rawls and 
Habermas. Both philosophers have acknowledged their theories are applicable 
within a liberal setting, which questions the comprehensiveness they presuppose. 
Nietzsche’s critique of hegemonic force of rationality-based modernity delineates 
the current global predicament that cultural diversity is fast disappearing because 
of the power of conformity driven by modernisation (which some argue as 
westernisation) . Its unifying power, rationally or forcefully, is not only levelling 
cultural barriers but also nature itself by selectively exploiting it.  
Nietzsche’s critique does not provide an alternative, but it illuminates the 
hegemonic character of present welfare, citizen and reason-driven politics. 
Nietzsche represents a different tradition of political thinking to that of 
consensualism, where all moral and political values derive and end in individuals 
as equal units within the social as if they equally contribute to moral and political 
discourse. Nietzsche argued that the death of god was the end of religion and 
philosophers ought to think of something other than Reason to replace the moral 
vacuum, countering the Enlightenment philosophers who had predicted Reason to 
triumph faith. However, from the scale of violence we witness in today’s world, due 
to religious or free market extremism, we need to reflect on the optimism of the 
early modern philosophers about the liberating power of rationality. It is 
reason-based science that created weapons of mass destruction, both nuclear and 
biological. Reason-based technology, while responsible for improving our lives, has 
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allowed states, corporations and individuals to effectively exploit nature as well as 
other humans for their own benefits. A very small minority controls much of the 
global wealth and resources, while a large number of people have little or no 
means for subsistence in many parts of the world.  Perhaps Nietzsche was right 
that Reason could neither emancipate nor create greatness. It is merely an 
instrument to control and tame nature as well as humans.  
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